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Abstract
Several studies of two-party negotiations have shown that negotiators more often than
not reach inefficient compromises. We analyze the circumstances under which rational
agents make inefficient compromises and refrain from improving them. We do this by
describing and interpreting various negotiation situations and by developing formal
constructs and theorems for determining the character of a negotiation situation. Key
among these concepts is the notion of opposition. Although opposition is defined in
terms of the utility functions, it is more fundamental in the sense that it is more intuitive
to decision makers and can be used in contexts in which the parties’ utilities are
unknown or are partially known. The effects of various rationality assumptions on
efficiency and their implications for negotiation support systems are discussed. We
argue that the prescriptive/descriptive approach advocated by negotiation analysts lacks
sufficient explanatory powers to be effectively used in negotiation support and that
negotiation support systems should not constrain the parties to the set of efficient points.
Keywords: bargaining, negotiations, negotiation analysis, conflict analysis, decision
and negotiation support, rationality, utility, efficiency, opposition
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1. Introduction
Alemi, Fos and Lacorte [1] conducted experiments with six professionals some of
whom were professional negotiators or were often involved in negotiations. These
experiments showed that the negotiators more often than not reached inefficient
compromises. They state that “If physicians and managers can arrive at Pareto optimal
contracts, then their negotiations are effective”. Similar results have been reported in [2]
with only 10 percent of 90 dyads achieving an efficient compromise, [3], [4] and [5].
Teich et al. [6] conducted experiments with students using two negotiation support sys-
tems. They also often did not achieve an efficient (i.e., Pareto-optimal) compromise.
Moreover, when the students were presented with an efficient compromise they did not
want to move from the inefficient to the efficient compromise.
In a discussion on rational choice in games McClennen [7], (p. 259) says that:
“When one turns to consider non-strictly competitive games, the assumption that
rational players are bound by the principle of maximization of expected utility
proves to be quite paradoxical. Except under very special circumstances, it
ensures that rational interaction will fail to satisfy the criterion of Pareto
optimality.”
This appears to be an unusual remark and one that has no support in the literature on
prescriptive decision making, rational agents and the application of decision analysis to
negotiations [5], [8]. On the other hand this remark, as indicated above, is substantiated
by real-life negotiation and by laboratory experiments. In this paper we analyze the
circumstances under which rational agents do not choose efficient compromise
proposals and achieve an inefficient compromise. We also make the argument that
rational agents who have achieved an inefficient compromise may not want to change it
and accept an efficient one, and present reasons for such behaviour. We take a cognitive
perspective and present formulae to model the reasons underlying the agents’ behaviour.
The discussion is illustrated with a simple case of two-issue bilateral negotiations.
2The objectives of this paper are two-fold. One is to describe and interpret different
negotiation situations and study situations in which rational agents fail to achieve
efficient compromises. The other is to argue that the asymmetrically
prescriptive/descriptive approach advocated by negotiation analysts [5], [8], [9] lacks
sufficient explanatory power and a consistent analytic framework to be effectively used
in negotiation support. Negotiation analysis does not take into account the rationalities
underlying the opponent’s behaviour, nor does it allow for multiple or divergent
rationalities, which are typical of human decision making [10]-[13]. We outline how
models of the opponent’s behaviour can be constructed from partial information.
We take a prescriptive/normative perspective. The normative perspective is in the
assumptions of both parties being rational, using logically consistent decision
procedures, and wanting to achieve an efficient compromise. The supported party is
being offered prescriptions on how to make better decision leading to an efficient
compromise. There are several significant distinctions to the traditional normative
approaches, prime among which is that we do not posit a single game-theoretic
rationality with a known utility function.
Negotiation analysts using the traditional approach live with the inconsistency of using
a model which assumes complete knowledge of the decision maker and the problem and
therefore presumes to give complete advice, but of having in reality to make
considerable practical modifications and adaptations since the problem is never
complete. This lack of completeness encompasses not only the opponent but also the
supported decision maker. Therefore, Lax and Sebenius [8], [14] amend formal
representations with numerous prescriptions that are more in line with the rules and
principles proposed by Fisher, Ury and their associates [15], [16] than with the prescrip-
tions of negotiation analysis [5]. Review of the applications and negotiation support sys-
tems that are based on negotiation analysis suggests two its main uses: education and re-
search [8], [17], [18].
Our view is that attempts to measure all relevant aspects of the problem are often
fruitless, any prescription is only partial and tentative, and that negotiation analysis and
support should not constrain the agents to the set of efficient offers. We advocate the
use of methods that permit formal analysis of whatever qualitative information is
available. In particular, the approach based on the concept of opposition that we propose
has the advantage of supporting analysis without requiring precise elicitation of the
parties’ utility curves over the entire space of feasible compromises. Moreover, it allows
one to use many attributes of the problem, process and decision makers that the parties
are unable to incorporate into their respective utilities. Indeed, the concept of opposition
or motivational force can be viewed as more fundamental in the sense that it exists for
problems for which utility functions cannot exist.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a negotiation case to
introduce the concepts and issues considered later. The assumptions and definitions of
the nature of opposition are formulated in Section 3. Formal conditions for efficient
compromises are obtained in Section 4. It has been observed (see, for example, [19]),
that even small changes in the parties’ preferences may change their relationship from
strong to weak opposition, and these cases are explored in Section 4. We show, further,
that the opposition may also change when the parties consider different alternatives
while maintaining their preferences. Behavioral reasons that may cause the negotiating
3agents to resist accepting an efficient compromise in the situation when an inefficient
one was negotiated are given in Section 5. Acceptance of inefficient compromises by
rational agents has significant implications for negotiation analysis and support and
some of these implications are presented in Section 6, which concludes the paper.
2. Two-Party Negotiations
2.1. Trade union case—Initial positions
Consider a simple case of negotiation between trade union and management over only
two issues.1 The first issue is salary. The second issue involves a bonus which is tied to
the production level; the bonus is being paid only after some number of widgets has
been produced. The number of widgets and the salary level are the subject of
negotiation. Not surprisingly, the union wants the highest possible salary level and the
lowest number of widgets. The management’s interests are opposing. The two sides
may have different preferences with respect to each issue, but each party does not know
the preferences of the other party, except qualitatively. Moreover, we assume that there
are no other issues known or unknown to the party.
The union announced its opening position and the management replied to it. The two
offers are presented in Table 1.
 Table 1.
Initial positions
Union (U0) Management (M0)
Salary level $ 7,000 $ 3,400
No. of widgets 1,200 5,100
2.2. Concessions and utility equivalent alternatives
The union decides to make a concession and propose a new offer of ($5,600; 2,700).
However, a decision analyst is among its membership and he persuades the negotiating
team to use his services. The analyst determines, through a series of pairwise compar-
isons,2 that the union’s negotiating team is indifferent among five alternatives including
the contemplated alternative ($5,600; 2,700). The five equivalent alternatives are given
in Table 2.
                                                
1 The case presented here is highly stylized. However, from our discussions with a trade union
negotiator, the manner—though not the language—in which the issues are discussed and the reasoning
process correspond to those experienced in real negotiations.
2 While we do not wish to underplay the difficulty of eliciting preference information such as this,
extending our example to model uncertainties and discussing the traditional lottery / fair-bet / revealed
preference issues that beset utility theory would considerably lengthen this paper and would be
incidental to its purpose—elucidating the properties of opposition and its implications with respect to
rationality and inefficiency in even the simplest deterministic case.
4Table 2.
Five equivalent alternatives
Alternatives e1 e2 e3 e4 e5
Salary level $ 5,100 $ 5,200 $ 5,600 $ 6,100 $ 6,600
No. of widgets 1,200 1,800 2,700 3,500 4,200
To get an analytical handle on the problem, the analyst attempts to fit a curve to the
e1—e5 point estimates. He chooses a hyperbola, guided both visually by the relative
positions of the points and by the asymptotic properties of the curve, and is able to
obtain a meaningful interpretation of the components of the resultant expression, as
described below. The analyst obtains the union’s utility function as:
UU (w,s) = 15 + 0.5 s +
3.902
w − 5.596
    (1)
where s  is the salary in 1000s of dollars, and w the number of widgets in 1000s of
widgets.
The constant 15 and the multiplication factor of 0.5 have no real significance as is usual
for utility functions, since utilities are determined unambiguously only up to a trans-
lation and a scaling[20], and have been simply chosen so as to make the 3D plot in
Fig. 1 easy to view. (For this particular choice of translation and scaling (15 and 0.5
respectively), the fitted curve corresponds to UU(w, s) ≈17.1.) The expression reflects
the union’s desire for a higher salary, as well as a desire to make as few widgets as
possible. The term (w – 5.59) in the denominator reflects the fact that it is impossible to
increase the number of widgets that can be humanly made beyond a point (about 5000),
and causes the utility to fall sharply (or all the level curves to rise steeply near that
point).
The analyst does not know the management's utility function and, therefore, he cannot
precisely determine the efficient solutions. However, he knows that the management is
interested in both low salary level and high number of widgets before the bonus is paid.
Thus, the management’s tradeoffs or indifference curves must have a positive slope
(i.e., the tangents at various points along the curve must form an acute angle with the
horizontal w axis).
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Figure 1.  Union’s utility function
The union negotiating team appreciates the analyst’s work and decides to make an offer
e2 = (1,800; $5,200) instead of e3 = (2,700; $5,600) which was earlier contemplated.
The analyst, to the surprise of the union team, strongly argues against this offer. He says
that selection of this offer may result in a “non-optimal” (or, strictly speaking,
inefficient) compromise. The analyst who during the earlier session with the team had
determined the team’s utility now wants to present an argument for selecting e4 =
(3,500; $6,100). He begins the presentation with Fig. 2.
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Figure 2.  Mapping of union’s utility in offer space
6Although the analyst does not know the precise tradeoffs, he can hypothesize the
extreme values of the tradeoffs, and make conservative estimates of a range of slopes
that  management’s indifference curves must lie within, at any point in the feasible set.
Fig. 3 illustrates the various possibilities, including the mapping of two extremal utility
functions U+M(s, w) and U-M(s, w), that he considers at e3.
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Figure 3. The range of management’s possible indifference curves at e3.
Function U+M(s,w) corresponds to the assumption that the management is
predominantly interested in widget production and much less in the salary level; while
U-M(s, w) reflects the assumption that the management's preference for low salary is
much stronger than widgets production. The analyst does not know the form of either of
these functions, but merely knows that their gradients (slopes, representing tradeoffs or
relative weighting between salary and widgets) must almost certainly be within extreme
values [0.3, 3]  as illustrated. Knowing just this, and the theorem given in section 4, he
can determine the region within which the contract curve must lie. We call this the
region of possibly efficient compromises and it is the shaded area E in Fig. 3.  Its
computation is described in Appendix A. It is the analyst’s contention that since the
estimates were conservative, the solutions just within the boundary of E (e.g., e6), while
possibly efficient, are less probably efficient than solutions in the interior of E, as the
former reflect extreme values of management's preferences.
The analyst presents Fig. 3 to the negotiating team and shows that e2 does not lie on any
possible contract curve. It means, he explains, that e2 is an inefficient compromise for
any possible utility function of the management. The closest and extremal possibly-ef-
ficient point which is utility-equivalent to e1, e2, ..., e5 is e6. He, therefore, is convinced
that selection of e2 may “push” the negotiation towards an inefficient compromise.
2.3. First compromise proposal
The union’s senior negotiator questions the analyst’s reasoning. She points out that
while the union is indifferent among the five alternatives, the management need not be.
The analyst interjects, saying that this is exactly the case and that if the union were to
select say, e1, the management may consider such an offer as negotiation in bad faith.
7This is because, although, e1 brings forth concessions made by the union, it may be
considered by the management as a worse offer than the opening position U0. The
management’s utility level may be higher at U0 than at e1.
The senior negotiator fully agrees with the analyst. She says that this is her very reason
for selecting e2 and not e3, e4 or e5. Proposing e2 is constructive because it shows the
union’s willingness to make concessions, e2 is better for the management than U0. At
the same time it gives the union flexibility in its future offers. The union, during the
later stages of negotiation, may present compromise proposals which are better for the
management but which do not require the union to make any concessions.
The union, for example, can reply with e3 or e4 to the management's counter offer to e2.
The selection of one of these alternatives (e3 or e4) would depend on the management’s
reply to e2; on the degree of their concessions. Moreover, she continues, selection of e2
may lead the management to assume that the union is much less interested in salary
level than in the bonus. This may lead the management to put pressure on the union to
accept a higher number of widgets. The union may accept it under condition that the
management accepts a higher level of salary. This may give the union a strategic
advantage over the management.
The analyst listens to the senior negotiator’s arguments and suggests that the current
utility does not reflect all the preferences of the union. He proposes to include offer
flexibility and the probability of management’s negative counter-offers to any given
offer. This expansion of the utility function is rejected by the union because of its
complexity, data requirements and the difficulty of making a meaningful comparison of
offer attributes. The senior negotiator states that an attempt to measure everything is
impractical and introduces endless decomposition of attributes and the vicious circle of
strategic interaction [20].
The analyst then suggests decreasing the concession level earlier agreed to by the union
and selecting an alternative which is on or near the efficient frontier. For example, the
union may select e*, depicted in Fig. 2, as its reply to M0. The union’s utility level at e*
is higher than at e2, that is UU(e*) > UU(e2), and thus—from the union's viewpoint—
the concession level is smaller.
The senior negotiator replies that this may significantly weaken the union’s arguments
in the future. The union, with the selection of e2, makes a significant concession and
this, if needed, can be explained to the management. The significant distance from U0
to e2 can be easily shown, for example with the use of Fig. 2 with removed the union’s
indifference curve. The union, proposing e2, makes concessions measured by the
changes in the levels of both negotiating issues (salary and production). These issues are
what the two sides are negotiating about. Therefore, a significant change cannot be
dismissed by the opponent.
Thus, the senior negotiator argues, choosing e* would amount to making small steps
without attempting to build an understanding between the parties, reducing the tensions
and making cooperative moves [8]. Offer e2 shows a significant concession made with
respect to one issue and a small one to another. It shows the union’s willingness to
negotiate efficiently but cautiously.
Assume, she continues, that the management replies to e* with an offer which is only
8marginally better than M0. We would have to reciprocate in kind and the negotiations
may take a long time or end in a deadlock. We have our constituency and this
negotiation is only a part of our responsibilities. She finishes with questions to the
analyst: Can you assure us that the result of “small steps” negotiation will yield a better
compromise for the union? Can you assess the increase in the union’s utility of a
compromise achieved after selecting e* as opposed to the selection of e2?
Decision analysis does not address this questions and the analyst decides to discontinue
the discussion and to concentrate instead on “post-settlement settlement” [5]. He thinks
that although the compromise the two parties achieve may be inefficient, he may be able
to propose an offer that will benefit both sides.
2.4. Offer exchange and actual compromise
The negotiation continues along the lines proposed by the senior negotiator. The union
replies to M0 = ($3,200; 5,100) with U1 = ($5,200; 1,800), (note that U1 = e2). The
management responds with a counter-offer M1 = ($4,000; 4,500) which the union
considers as an improvement over M0. However, the union believes that the
management’s offer does not match the union’s concession. The senior negotiator points
out that with the earlier selection of U1 the union has now flexibility in its response. It
may propose an offer which requires a very small or no decrease in its utility while
maintaining negotiations in good faith. This is because the management should perceive
the new proposal as being significantly better than U1. Moreover, she adds, the counter-
offer should visibly reduce the distance between the union’s and the management’s
positions (see Fig. 4) and indicate their willingness to get both parties closer to a
compromise.
Taking the above into considerations, the union proposes U2 = ($5,200; 2,700) to which
the management replies with M2 = ($4,400; 4,100). Both the union and the management
realize that the compromise is close and, after a long meeting, they agree on the
compromise UM = ($4,700; 3,300). The negotiation process leading to the compromise
UM is illustrated in Fig. 4.
X
3
4
5
6
7
21 3 4 5
U0
Widgets (w)
Salary (s)
U1
M2U2
M1
M0
UM
Figure 4. Union/management negotiations in offer space
The two parties achieve a compromise that seems to satisfy them. We argue that the
9union’s decisions were based on the rational premises; they included internal aspects of
the  problem (trade-offs and utility) and external aspects (opponent’s needs, reactions,
and other stakeholders). The union made moves analyzing its criteria and determined its
utility function. Based on this analysis, it selected an offer (U1), with a strategic
perspective. This offer, from the decision analysis viewpoint, brought forth concessions
that the union was earlier willing to make. The concessions were significant and they
could be presented to the management as such. It is also a flexible offer, as it allows the
union to make further offers without making any concessions on its part but which
would increase the management’s utility and thus be considered by the management as
concessions. Moreover, at no point in time the union could be accused of making
negotiations in bad faith, each of its contemplated or actual offers was getting the two
parties closer to a compromise in the sense that it decreased the distance which
negotiators may use (e.g., the block measure).
2.5  Post-settlement settlements and accuracy
Union and management achieved the compromise UM. The analyst now needs to
determine if UM is efficient. This is a straightforward exercise that requires the use of
Theorem 1, given in Section 4, if the analytical form of the two utility functions is
known. Thus, the analyst must determine the management’s utility. Assume, that the
management is willing to cooperate and that the analyst determines that the
management's indifference curves are as depicted in Figure 6. This implies that the
compromise UM is inefficient. Realizing this he suggests a post-settlement settlement.
Offers D or P2 should be considered as a final compromise. He adds that, with the
selection of P2, the management will be able to increase its utility value from 25.1 at
UM to 26.8.
The management seems reluctant to accept the analyst’s arguments and one of the team
members states that she really does not see any improvements. The analyst explains that
from his discussion with the team he was able to precisely determine the management’s
utility and this allowed him to propose a compromise better than UM. The member
raises the issue of accuracy. She says that the trade-offs really reflect the average
perception of all the members and cannot be considered precisely. She therefore asks
the analyst to conduct sensitivity analysis.
The analyst determines the range of changes in the trade-off values for which UM is
efficient and for which the P2 is efficient and presents them to the management team.
The discussion then concentrates on the issue whether the trade-off value between
widgets and salary is indeed exactly 2.7. It continues for some time, when the
management realizes that this discussion is meaningless because they cannot give a
precise value. Then, the analyst asks management to rank the three alternatives UM, D
and P2. The management team selects D as a clearly better option than UM, but is not
able to differentiate between D and P2.
The analyst returns to the union representatives and suggest that, instead of UM, D be
selected and that if the union agrees the management may be willing to accept this offer.
He points out, that the union prefers D over UM and, therefore, they should accept it, or
even suggest P2 as the final compromise. The discussion following the analyst’s
presentation closely resembles one he earlier had with the management. In effect UM
remains the accepted compromise.
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Note that we considered here a highly unrealistic situation with the analyst having full
information about both parties. Most often the knowledge about the opponent is only
partial. As we will show in Section 4, even small changes in the evaluation of the
utilities may cause significant changes in the contract curves and move the efficient
solutions from the boundary to the interior of X or vice versa.
3. Assumptions and Definitions
We consider two party negotiations over issues on which certain constraints are
imposed. The negotiations are conducted in the offer space ℜ which is an n-dimensional
space of real numbers. The set X ⊆ ℜ of feasible options is defined by constraints which
both parties must obey and it is assumed convex. Utilities UM(x) and UU(x), of the two
parties are functions defined over X and its “neighborhood;” they are in general convex
(or concave) functions. Equality or inequality constraints on these functions therefore
define convex curves and regions in X.
For the most part, we assume that the parties’ utilities are stable over time. This is not
really a restriction with respect to our objectives since it is easy to understand changing
preferences as a cause of non efficient compromises (the solution to the changed
problem is non efficient with respect to the original problem); indeed our intention is to
show that even with stable utilities there are reasons for terminating negotiation with an
inefficient compromise.
We make the assumption that each party knows his or her own utility function, but not
the other party’s. This reflects the fact that in real-world negotiations the exact
preferences of the other party are incompletely known to each side, and this information
is often guarded because it may be disadvantageous to reveal one’s true preferences.
However, it may be possible to make a qualitative estimate of the other party’s utility
function, and we will explore this possibility. Indeed, the concepts we develop will
make it possible to provide support without having the utility function of either party.
Incomplete information as a cause of inefficiency has been previously studied and is
well known [21]-[24]. These studies demonstrate this in fairly restricted negotiations in
which one characteristic is unknown, but strong assumptions are made about the rest of
the problem and the negotiators’ cognitive capabilities. Lax and Sebenius [14], (Chapter
7) look at more general negotiations and conclude that under incomplete information,
the tension between creating and claiming value is a primary cause of inefficient out-
comes.
We are more concerned with the manner in which tactics, strategic moves and cognitive
limitations, rather than incomplete information, lead to inefficient compromises. These
issues include trust and animosity, external pressure, flexibility considerations, other
decision problems and parties encountered, anticipation of future negotiations, and
manipulation of the parties’ motivations. A typical demonstration will be that a small
change in the assessment of the opponent’s utility function or additional considerations
of the opponent’s reactions, can result in a drastic change in the character of the
negotiations, e.g., converting it from distributive to cooperative, and turning the
compromise from nearly efficient to clearly inefficient.
Definition 1.  The contract curve (CC) is the subset of the feasible set X ⊆ ℜ which
11
contains only efficient solutions.
For unconstrained problems (X = ℜ) the contract curve was first discussed by
Edgeworth [25]. In constrained problems (X ⊂ ℜ), the contract curve may be contained
in X, partially contained and partially determined by the frontiers (constraint
boundaries) of X, or fully located on the frontiers of X [25]. The contract curve in offer-
space corresponds to the Pareto frontier in utility-space. Thus, the Pareto frontier and
the contract curve are fully defined by the two utility functions and X.
Further, we characterize the nature of the relationship by defining the opposition
between two negotiating parties. We use the term “opposition” in a general sense
referring to relationships between the motivations or preferences of the two agents with
respect to each other. Intuitively, the strength of opposition is the level of
(dis)agreement between the parties at any point p ∈ ℜ or over a region of possible
offers, X ⊆ ℜ. Strict or strong opposition is typical of strictly competitive games when
any gain for one party can be achieved only at a loss for another party. At the other
extreme, weak or a complete lack of opposition means that both parties simultaneously
achieve either losses or gains. This distinction corresponds roughly to the win-lose and
win-win types of negotiations. Our formal characterization of opposition allows for a
finer distinction of types of negotiation and more comprehensive analysis. In particular,
it can help the parties obtain an intuitive, qualitative understanding of how different
regions of X are characterized by different levels of opposition, and can thus motivate
and guide the search for solutions that release the tension between cooperative versus
distributive bargaining.
Since opposition between the two parties can vary considerably over the offer space
(with one pair of positions considered highly antagonistic and another pair being highly
cooperative), we need to describe the local properties of the relationship. We first begin
with the opposition at any point of the offer space ℜ.
Definition 2. The parties are in local strict opposition at a point x ∈ ℜ iff for all points
x´ ∈ ℜ that are sufficiently close to x (i.e., for some ε, ε > 0, such that ∀x′ x′ − x < ε ),
an increase of one utility can be achieved only at the expense of a decrease of the other
utility.
The above definition can be usefully restated using vector calculus as follows. Recall
that the level curves or indifference curves of a utility function U(x) are curves of
constant utility value U(x) = c, for some c. The gradient ∇U(x)  at a point x is therefore
perpendicular to the level curve of U(x) that goes through x. Further, U(x) increases
most rapidly at x in the direction of the gradient, and it decreases most rapidly in the
opposite direction. The rate of increase in any direction e is given by  e •∇U(x) . As
discussed in Section 4, points of local strict opposition (Definition 2) are exactly those
at which the gradients of the two utility functions point in opposite directions, i.e., x ∈
ℜ such that ∇U1(x) = − k ∇U2 (x), k > 0 , and this property could constitute an
alternative definition of points of local strict opposition. Using the geometric
interpretation of the gradients, these points may also be called tangential points, i.e.,
points where level curves meet tangentially.
Definition 3. The parties are in local nonstrict opposition at a point x ∈ ℜ iff they are
not in local strict opposition at x, i.e., iff it is possible for both parties to raise their
12
utilities by moving an infinitesimal distance from x.
We also introduce two additional types of opposition based on the tension between the
two parties at an offer in terms of the cooperativeness or conflict between the interests
(utilities) of the two sides. Since each utility gradient represents the “central interests”
or most preferred direction in which a party would like to move, if the two directions
are close to each other, the two parties have more scope for cooperatively improving
upon the compromise than if the two gradients were in largely opposing directions.3
Definition 4. The parties are in local weak opposition at a point x ∈ ℜ iff
∇U1(x) • ∇U2(x) ≥ 0 , i.e., iff the gradients at x of the two utility functions form an
acute or right angle.
Definition 5. The parties are in local strong opposition at a point x ∈ ℜ iff
∇U1(x) • ∇U2(x) < 0 , i.e., iff the gradients at x form an obtuse angle.
While local opposition allows us to discuss the nature of the opposition for an
individual position—which is in or out of the feasible set X—such as an initial offer, a
counter-offer and a compromise, we can define global opposition which characterizes—
and is restricted to—the entire set of feasible offers.
Definition 6. The parties are in global strict (nonstrict, weak, strong) opposition iff for
every x ∈ X they are in local strict (nonstrict, weak, strong) opposition.
Strict and nonstrict global oppositions are complementary cases. We will show that
under global strict opposition the contract curve is identical to the whole of X.  In the
case of global nonstrict opposition, the contract curve lies on the frontier of X. There are
also negotiation cases with local nonstrict opposition at some points of X and strict
opposition at others. In these cases the contract curve is either on the frontier of X or,
more often, partially on the frontier and partially in the interior of X.
Another type of opposition that is intermediate in scale between local and global
opposition is offer-pair opposition. It is defined, as the name implies, on a pair of points
in offer space.  Given that the two parties have made offers x1 and x2 respectively, the
offer-pair opposition between the two parties is ∇U1(x1) • ∇U2(x2 ) , and its nature can
be characterized as strong or weak as before, based on whether its value is negative or
positive. Offer-pair opposition is useful in modelling the relationship between the two
parties at early stages of the negotiation when there is no single point that is genuinely
under consideration as a final compromise. In such situations, the gradients at the offers
indicate which directions are most preferred for each party, and they may choose to take
this into account in concession making.
A curve that is closely allied to the contract curve (CC) and useful in conceptualizing
the preference and efficiency structure of the offer space is the following:
Definition 7.  The tangential point curve (TPC) is the set of points x ∈ ℜ  at which the
two utility functions satisfy ∇U1(x) = − k ∇U2 (x), k > 0 , i.e., points at which the level
curves of the two utility functions are tangential to each other.
                                                
3
 This can be formally proved by considering the width of the band of directions that would result in
joint improvement, given any two values for the gradients.
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Part of this curve coincides with the contract curve under certain conditions (one of
which is that the relevant portion of the TPC must be within the feasible set), and thus
represents the efficient set under those conditions.  However its more useful property is
the fact that the gradients of both utilities, anywhere in ℜ, always point roughly towards
the TPC  regardless of where the TPC may be located (in or out of the feasible set); this
helps in visualizing the relationship between the two parties when depicted as a field of
arrows.  Put another way, “CC tends towards TPC”, and a special case of this property
is the result that when the TPC is entirely outside the feasible set, the Pareto-optimal set
(CC) must lie on the boundary of X, on those segments that are closest to the TPC.
These aspects are explored in Section 4.
4. Opposition and Compromises
4.1. Conditions for efficient compromises
The efficiency of the compromise UM depends, for a given value of union’s utility, on
the management’s utility function. Assume that UM is efficient. The management’s
utility level curve or indifference curve, for simplicity assumed linear, is depicted in
Fig. 4. Moving from UM results in an increase in one party’s utility at the expense of
the other party’s utility. This is because the parties are in strict opposition at UM.
Given a pair of analytic utility functions, the following theorem establishes purely local
criteria that can be applied to determine whether a given position is an efficient point or
not. Alternatively, the theorem can be viewed as the defining equation of the contract
curve (efficient set) in offer space. In unconstrained negotiations, only the first half of
the theorem can apply, and the theorem effectively says that the TPC (tangential point
curve) is identical to CC.
The results in this section can be easily generalized to higher dimensional vector spaces
(m parties negotiating over n issues), but we will keep the discussion to two dimensions
to continue our case study and illustrate concepts geometrically.  Further, these results
hold under the slightly weaker requirement of quasiconvexity rather than convexity of
UU(x), UM(x) and B(x).
Let B(x) = 0 denote the equation of the boundary of X, defining x ∈ X iff B(x) •  0.
Then ∇B(x) is the outward normal direction to the boundary of X at x.
Theorem 1. Offer x* ∈ X  is efficient iff, either
(A)  x* is in the interior of X and the local opposition at x* is strict, i.e.,
∇UU(x*) = –k ∇UM(x*), (2)
where k is some positive constant, or
(B)  x* is on the boundary of X, and for some α, β •  0
  α ∇UU(x*) + β ∇UM(x*)  = ∇B(x*). (3)
given convex/concave utility functions and a convex feasible set.
Qualitative Explanation
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The theorem treats interior points and boundary points of the feasible set X differently,
and part A essentially says that an interior point is efficient iff it is a point at which
some level curves of the two parties meet tangentially.  A utility gradient indicates the
direction in which its agent would most prefer to go if she only considered small
immediate gains, and any direction making an acute angle with the gradient (i.e., any
direction d such that d • ∇Ui(x) > 0) is a direction in which the utility can be improved.
Therefore, if the two agents do not have exactly opposing gradients, there is a direction
in which both can jointly improve their position from the current one, and the current
position is not efficient.  So local strict opposition is a necessary condition—and
sufficient, with convex/concave utility functions—for an interior point to be efficient.
However, there may be no tangential points within X (either because they are all outside
X or because there exist no tangential points at all for the given utility functions). In that
case the efficient set will lie on the boundary of X.  The local conditions that identify
which boundary points are efficient are given in part B of the theorem, and essentially
say that there is no direction for improvement within the set X at a boundary efficient
point. The expression  α ∇UU(x*) + β ∇UM(x*)  defines a convex cone of directions at
x*, and when the outward normal to the boundary lies within this cone, any direction
into X at x* must make an obtuse angle with at least one of the two utility gradients,
thereby failing to improve that utility.
Proof:
(A) Every point x* in X, must lie on some unique level curve of each utility function,
and the level curve of UU(x) that passes through x* is described by the equation UU(x) =
UU(x*). This level curve defines the boundary of a set C = {x∈X s.t. UU(x) • UU(x*)} .
Clearly, x* is efficient iff UM(x) is maximized within C at x* (points outside C are
eliminated because those points are dominated with respect to the UU  criterion, and
points at which UM is not maximum are dominated by points at which it is).  Thus we
convert the problem of maximizing both UU(x) and UM(x) over X to one of maximizing
UM(x) given UU(x) • UU(x*).
This constrained optimization problem is easily solved by the standard method of
Lagrange (see, for example, [27]), and immediately gives us the equation ∇UM(x*) +
λ ∇UU(x*) = 0, λ≥0, as the general form of the solution, where λ is the Lagrange
multiplier. This equation is rewritten as (2) to convey the geometric properties of the
solution.
(B) Since the conversion of the two-criterion maximization problem to the constrained
single-criterion maximization problem is general, we have the identical requirement, to
maximize UM(x) given UU(x) •  UU(x*) now, however, with an additional constraint,
B(x) = 0.  Once again applying the method of Lagrange, we get the general form of the
solution as ∇UM(x*) + λ ∇UU(x*) + µ∇B(x*) = 0, λ≥0, µ•0.  µ is positive or negative
according to whether the inner or outer normal direction of B(x) is considered the
gradient ∇B(x); in our case, with B(x) • 0 defining the region X, µ is negative. A simple
rewriting of this expression obtains (3). ♦
Note that parts A and B of the theorem are exhaustive but not mutually exclusive
because when both conditions apply we have tangential points on the boundary.
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We now discuss special cases of opposition and their implications for the nature of the
contract curve.
4.2. Strict opposition
Global opposition requires that at every point in X the local opposition is always the
same (strict or nonstrict).
Theorem 2. Assume that the agents’ preferences differ. They are in global strict
opposition in X if UU and UM are linear and in local strict opposition at any one
point in X.
Proof: If UU and UM are linear, the gradients of the two utilities are constant vectors all
over X.  Thus the two gradients align (in opposite directions) either everywhere or
nowhere in X.  Therefore given any point of local strict opposition in X, global strict op-
position is implied. ♦
The converse is not true; given global strict opposition (∀x∈X  ∇UU(x) = –k UM(x)), the
two utility functions need not be linear.  Any pair of nonlinear functions such that one is
the negative of the other satisfies this condition.  A corollary to the theorem is that
global strict opposition with one linear utility implies that the other utility function must
also be linear.
The implication of Theorem 2 is that for the linear utilities and local strict opposition,
the indifference curves are tangential at every point in X, and the whole set X of feasible
solutions is efficient.  For linear utilities without local strict opposition, the entire
interior of X is inefficient and the efficient set lies on the boundary.  (This is a special
case of the theorem involving monotonicity below.) This is not the case for strictly
convex (concave) utilities or when at least one of the utilities is nonlinear (Figure 3, for
example). Thus, in the case of strictly opposing parties, a linear approximation of the
nonlinear utilities may result in significant errors and make impossible discrimination of
offer efficiency.
C2
D
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1
Figure 5. Local strict opposition and inefficient compromises
From Theorem 2 it follows that in the linear case and strict initial opposition nego-
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tiations always terminate in an efficient compromise. We consider this special case,
with condition (2) holding between the initial points, i.e., with  ∇UU(u0) = –k ∇UM(m0).
The nonlinear situation is illustrated in Fig. 5. The contract curve is non-linear and,
depending on the initial offers and set X, it may initially be on the boundary of X.  Strict
local opposition (and thus efficiency) at the initial points does not ensure that
negotiations will terminate in an efficient compromise, as the figure illustrates.
If C1  or  C2 is the compromise then it is inefficient because the parties’ utilities are not
tangential at these points. Both parties may increase their respective utilities if they
select any point from the dashed line. An efficient compromise is at point D.
4.3. Nonstrict opposition
In the case of global nonstrict opposition, that is, if ∃ x∈X such that
∇UU (x) = − k ∇UM (x), the contract curve lies on the boundary of X because condition
(a) of Theorem 1 does not apply in X and thus (b) holds. We illustrate the case of global
nonstrict opposition with a revised example of union-management negotiation and, as
before, take the union’s perspective. The two parties make the same initial proposals
and counter-offers and reach the same compromise as previously. As we indicate in Fig.
6, the only difference is in the management's utility. The change in the utility from the
one depicted in Fig. 4 is not very significant. In fact, it could be even smaller and the
effect would be the same (for illustrative purposes we made a greater change in the
indifference curves), that is the achieved compromise UM would be inefficient. The
same behaviour of the two parties leads now to inefficiency because of different, than in
Fig. 4, management’s utility. In this case the contract curve consists of two intervals
[U0, P2], [P2, M0].
U1
M2
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D
Figure 6. Global nonstrict opposition and an inefficient compromise.
The strength of opposition depends both on objectives and preferences. The
management’s objectives remain the same, it wants more of widgets and less of salary,
but the trade-off coefficients change. The management is now more interested in salary
(see Fig. 6) than it was in the example illustrated in Fig. 4. This small change moves
negotiations from local strict opposition at some points within X to global nonstrict
opposition. This phenomenon has been observed in both real-life situations and in
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laboratory experiments [19]. Note that since this change may not be known to the other
party, the sequence of offers and counter-offers may be the same as illustrated in Fig. 4.
4.4. Weak and Strong Opposition
To consider the conditions for the weak and strong forms of opposition we make two
assumptions. One, often used in economics and utility theory, is that the utilities are
monotonic functions. The second assumption is that rational agents will not negotiate
issues on which they are both indifferent. While strategic misrepresentation is possible,
that is, a party may introduce an issue which has no implications for its own utility, this
issue has to be at least relevant for the opponent. The implication of this assumption is
that
∀ x ∈ X : •UU(x) / •xj = 0 —> •UM(x) / •xj •  0,  j=1,2 (5)
(and similarly with the utilities switched).
Theorem 3. Given UU(x) and UM(x) monotonic, and no irrelevant issues, if there is
local weak opposition at any one point in X, then the two parties are in global
nonstrict opposition over X.
It is not possible to prove a stronger result: e.g., local weak opposition does not imply
global weak opposition; the strength of opposition can vary across X, even under the re-
strictive monotonicity assumption.  However, the above theorem is quite useful since it
concerns efficiency (global nonstrict opposition implies that efficient points are located
only on the boundary, due to theorem 1).
Theorem 4 (complementary to 3). Given monotonic UU(x) and UM(x) and no
irrelevant issues, if there is local strict opposition at any point within X, then the two
parties are in global strong opposition.
Proofs of 3 and 4:  Monotonicity implies that the derivatives do not change sign, i.e.,
each derivative is always nonnegative or nonpositive.  Thus each of the components of
the gradient vectors maintains the same sign throughout X.  Since ∇UU(x*) = –
k∇UM(x*) at an efficient point x*, it follows that the corresponding components of the
two gradient vectors must have opposite signs or be both zero at x*.  The latter
possibility is ruled out by the assumption of no irrelevant issues. By monotonicity, the
signs of the components at x* must hold throughout X. Consequently if a tangential
point exists within X the dot product of the two vectors must be negative throughout X
(i.e., the opposition is globally strong). Since local weak opposition at a point  x’ ∈ X  is
defined by
∇UU(x’) • ∇UM(x’) > 0 (6)
it follows that it is not possible to have an efficient point within X and simultaneously
have weak opposition anywhere in X. That is, local weak opposition at any point in X
implies that there are no efficient points in the interior of X . ♦
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Theorem 5 (Generalization of theorem 4). If UU(x) and UM(x) are monotonic and
the gradients at any one point in X are directed into opposite quadrants of X, then the
two parties are in global strong opposition over X.
Proof: As explained with theorem 3, monotonicity alone implies that each of the compo-
nents of the gradient vectors maintains the same sign throughout X. When the two
vectors are directed into opposite quadrants we have ∇ΤUU(x) ∇UM(x) < 0, which
implies that each pair of corresponding components of the two vectors must be of
opposite signs. Consequently the dot product of the two vectors must be negative in X,
∇UU(x) • ∇UM(x) < 0, and the opposition is globally strong. ♦
A complementary theorem for gradients falling into the adjacent quadrants can be
proved; this is a generalization of theorem 3.
5. Rationalities and Efficiency
In Section 2 we discussed negotiations in which the two parties achieved a compromise
with efficiency depending on the nature of the opposition. The efficiency conditions for
different forms of opposition were developed in Section 4, and showed that any feasible
offer might be an efficient solution, not just on the boundary of X. The conditions are
specified for utility functions defined on the problem attributes and the parties’
preferences, and the discussion of inefficient compromises thus far has been based on
the structure of the underlying problem and preferences. In this section we will consider
both problem-structural and behavioural reasons for inefficiency and present arguments
as to why rational agents do not, and often should not, select an efficient compromise.
5.1. Opposition and efficiency
The results obtained in Section 4.4 also hold for offer-pair opposition. Therefore,
knowledge of the opposition between the initial pair of offers provides information
about the possible location of the efficient points. For example, given weak opposition
between this pair,  all the efficient points are on the boundaries of feasible set X. If the
boundaries are known to both parties then “rational” agents can guess at and
approximate the efficient set. If, however, the boundaries are not known or X = ℜ, then
rational, i.e., utility maximizing parties cannot achieve an efficient compromise. This is
because given weak opposition any offer can be improved and there are no efficient
compromises. Thus, feasibility plays a critical role in weakly opposing parties.
In the complementary theorem’s situation, since the opposition is strong, efficient points
are likely to be in the interior of X. This implies that the constraints defining X may be
insignificant and only the parties’ utilities define efficient compromises. Thus, the
acceptability  of the offer to the parties becomes critical. The compromise’s efficiency
depends on accurate assessment of one’s own party’s and one’s opponent’s utilities.
Weak opposition allows for win-win negotiations while strong opposition suggests win-
lose negotiations. A significant effort is often made to move the parties from the win-
lose situation to win-win. This requires change in the opposition and, therefore, in their
utilities. If successful, such a change requires joint agreement on the set of feasible
solutions.
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We assumed that utilities are stable over time. The problem-structural properties may,
however, lead negotiators to change their utilities so that the set of available
compromises is defined by objective constraints and not solely by subjective utilities.
Attempts to modify utilities are usually considered desirable if they allow one to move
from win-lose to win-win negotiations and expand the “pie”. Thus, an initially efficient
solution may become inefficient.
Weak (or strong or strict) opposition, when based on problem attributes, are structural
notions directly characterizing the underlying interests of the parties. While they may be
powerful in influencing the progress of negotiation and the outcomes, they are not the
sole determining factors.
5.2. Attributes of the agent
The attributes of the agent are all the characteristics that describe the decision maker
and her behavior. These include knowledge and cognitive capability, risk attitude,
ability and willingness to cooperate, sense of responsibility, power, and leadership.
Preferences describe the values and trade-offs of the agent but they are defined on the
problem attribute values and do not take into account the agent’s attributes.
Recognition of human cognitive limitations led Simon [29] to propose a much weaker
form of rationality, namely bounded rationality. Obviously, negotiators who are only
partially rational in the utilitarian sense and employ satisficing behavior may never be
able to achieve efficient compromises. However, fully rational negotiators also have to
balance the problem and the agent attributes.
The attributes of the agent may modify the choice mechanism. This has been illustrated
with the consideration of the impact of relative power and time pressure on making
offers in bargaining [30]. Perception of power may impact the scope of concessions but
it may also cause selection of different offers for a given utility value. For a given
concession level (measured with the utility function), the party may select an offer
which yields the lowest utility of the opponent. This may lead to a different sequence of
offers and an inefficient compromise. If such a compromise is achieved then rational
negotiators should make a joint attempt to improve it.
In decision analysis, risk and risk attitude is associated with the outcomes and used in
estimation of the expected utility. Post-settlement settlement introduces additional risk
which negotiators may not be willing to accept. Opening the negotiation process anew
may endanger what had already been achieved and, therefore, the negotiators may
knowingly accept an inefficient compromise.
5.3. Process attributes
Negotiation is a process that has its own process attributes such as time, effort,
communication and monetary requirements. For example, in our simple case, the parties
achieved a compromise based on the “split the difference” principle because they
perceived that the differences between the two last offers (U2 and M2 in Fig. 4) do not
warrant spending more time and effort on further discussions. This is an example of
trade-offs between the utility of a decision and the agent and process attribute values.
Obviously, the split the difference approach may result in an inefficient compromise.
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Consideration of the phases of negotiations introduce a qualitative difference between
the initial offers, intermediary offers and the final offers [10]. The first offer is made
only after the agent secured sufficient process resources in the pre-negotiation phase.
Offers made during the phases of differences exploration and their reduction deplete
these resources. Thus, a potential offer is evaluated not only in its contribution to the
final compromise but also in its resource implications for both parties [31].
Negotiations may be concluded if a party underestimated the resource requirements and
its resources are depleted. More often, in the final bargaining phase the parties realize
that the compromise is within reach. This may significantly change their perspective as
the parties realize that the remaining resources can be used elsewhere. Since the process
resources are often very expensive (e.g., the time of the executives and managers) and
generic because they can be used elsewhere, there is strong competition for their
distribution among different activities.
Negotiators with the achievement of a compromise become able to use their time and
effort on other issues and solve other problems. As the union chief negotiator said, there
is a constituency and many other issues have to be addressed. Students, in the
experiments discussed in [6], completed the exercise and saw no reason to move from
the achieved compromises. It may be that they thought that the time they saved in
accepting the compromises would be better used elsewhere. The key issue here is that
with the achievement of a compromise the trade-off analysis changes from the
comparison of potential gains and losses between offers to comparison of these offers
with expected gains from solving other problems using the available resources. Possible
exceptions may occur with professional negotiators and advisors who are being paid for
the process of securing the best possible compromise.
5.4. Meta-utility
One may argue that the deficiency of the above discussion is its restriction to a utility
defined only on the offer space, that is, on decision attributes. When all the attributes are
taken into account then rational agents would always achieve efficient compromises.
We accept this argument; on philosophical grounds the utilitarian approach will indeed
result in efficiency. The question is how this can be translated into formal analysis and
support mechanisms in the situation when some of the attributes are initially unknown
and may never be known while other attributes are the result of the process which is to
be controlled with the utility considerations. We do not know of any realistic approach
which takes this into account. Game theory, negotiation analysis and other decision-
theoretic approaches allow for only a few attributes of the agent and/or of the process
and assume that their values are constant during negotiations.
An attempt to apply the utilitarian approach introduces a significant complexity to
problem representation and solution. There are no grounds to assume that there is only
one utility. On the contrary, Nozick [12] argues that at least three different utilities need
be considered, the evidentially expected utility (a deterministic case is considered here),
the causally expected utility and the symbolic utility. While efficiency can be
determined with respect to one or two utilities, its absence cannot suggest that the
decision maker is not rational. Due to the additional dimensions defining other attributes
than those of the problem, the existence of competitive options and other decision
problems, and different utilities one can assume that the rational agents will achieve an
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efficient compromise only in exceptional situations. Unless they disregard a number of
aspects and features of the overall negotiation situation they may have important
reasons not to follow the efficient frontier.
Even if all is known to all parties and the meta-utilities can be determined there is the
issue of certainty. A negotiator may assume that the opponent is rational with
probability of one but not with certainty. This allows the opponent to attempt to change
this probability with the selection of inefficient offers. The argument may be such as the
one given by the union negotiator in making offer e3 (see Fig. 2). Varoufakis, [32]
(Chapter 6) shows that such a behavior may allow one party to achieve an improved
compromise which, however, need not be efficient.
6. Implication for analysis and support
The prescriptive representations of the supported party assumes that all relevant
problem, agent and process attributes are modelled and a meta-utility is constructed.
There may be two reasons for such an effort. One is to better understand oneself and the
problem, and such an effort is worthwhile. The other reason is to follow the model’s
prescriptions. We discussed the difficulty in constructing such a model but the most
important drawback to following its prescriptions is the negotiator’s subservience to
mechanistic moves, inducing an inability to be creative and to understand the rationality
guiding the opponent’s moves.
We derived the concept of the opposition from that of utility and formulated theorems
which allow negotiators to determine the set of efficient compromises. We also
presented arguments against basing offer formulation on utility, and the limitations of
utility-based approaches to negotiation analysis and support. This apparent contradiction
can be resolved if—as we advocate here—opposition and its role are viewed in more
general terms. This is because opposition may reflect some of the attributes of the
agents and the process in addition to those of the problem.
We have introduced four types of opposition and their implications. These are clearly
more basic and therefore of wider applicability than utilities; for any type of opposition
we have many different utilities. We also think that opposition is a social phenomenon
which can be easily understood because it is closely related to conflict or consonance.
Opposition can be approximated or modified with elements (attributes) that are difficult
to measure and embedded in utility. The question which the negotiator has to answer is
whether an additional issue or attribute weakens or strengthens the opposition and to
what degree. The “degree” need not be precise as it is sufficient to know whether the
two parties remain strictly opposed or whether the opposition moves from strong to
weak or vice versa.
Specification of the nature of the opposition allows for approximation of the efficient
set. In the case of weak opposition this set may be approximated with some accuracy
because even without knowing the utility functions some boundaries will clearly be
efficient. However, this seems less relevant than the knowledge of the critical
boundaries. This knowledge allows the parties to focus their efforts on softening of the
binding constraints. In the pre-negotiation phase the parties assess the strength of the
opposition. If it is weak then they identify the binding constraints and during the phase
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of difference exploration discuss the possibility of softening them. Then the parties may
concentrate on offers which are defined by the agreed upon constraints or in their
neighborhood.
A significant difference between the use of utility and opposition is that the latter opens
up the possibility of including all perceived attributes (including agent and process
attributes) without their formal representation and without a laborious process of
preference elicitation. Utility is obtained through the bottom-up analytic approach that
requires the decision maker to provide a comprehensive specification of all relevant
attributes and to make a thorough and detailed comparison between them. Opposition is
more of a qualitative concept and allows for a holistic approach. The decision maker
may conduct analysis having an intuitive understanding of the strength of the
opposition, with no specification of the underlying attributes and preferences.
Another difference is in the consideration of the process with respect to joint gains.
Joint gains cannot be achieved if the parties are in strict opposition and do not wish to
modify it. The efficiency of win/lose negotiations is defined by parties’ utilities. Al-
though this type of negotiation cannot be ruled out, experienced negotiators and
mediators make an effort to change the nature of the opposition from strict to strong or
even weak. Here too, the analysis of the opposition facilitates the process and may help
to “increase the pie”.
Weakening of the opposition moves the set of efficient compromises towards the
boundaries of X. However, it seems less relevant whether the parties select an efficient
compromise when they engage in the process of identifying differences and searching
for similarities. Discussion on opposition and attempts to modify it allow for such a
behavior. Obviously it involves changes of the utilities but this is the strength of the
approach. Although it may be based on detailed analytical considerations, it allows
broadening of one’s perspective and calls for a creative use of resources.
Application of analysis and support based on opposition in the example given in Section
2 does not necessarily disallow the construction and use of utility functions. However,
these functions are no longer required to approximate the efficient solutions. The union,
instead of trying to guess the management's utility may assess the type of opposition for
the compromise solutions it contemplates.
We presented here an approach which has considerably weaker informational
requirements than the approaches based on utility theory. Another important
characteristic of our approach is that it is general and allows for consideration of
different, dynamically changing and nonquantifiable attributes. Research on how these
attributes can be incorporated and whether they should be introduced into opposition or
treated separately is required.
One research direction to consider is the separation of forces pulling apart from these
pulling together. Neither individual utilities nor opposition as discussed here allows to
make a distinction between different efficient solutions. It is obvious, however, that
only some of these solutions may be acceptable as compromises. Within utility
framework different methods are proposed leading to aggregation of individual utilities.
Practical use of these methods is minimal as they require the parties’ discussion about
their relative power and strength of conviction. Within the approach we propose,
opposition may be complemented with cooperation which define the strength of the
23
willingness to negotiate. Cooperation may allow to distinguish between efficient
solutions, for example, in Fig. 2, cooperation for U0 is weaker than for e*. It also may
allow to distinguish between utility-equivalent solutions e1, …, e6. In that sense, the
constructiveness of an offer mentioned by the union's negotiator (Section 2.3) is related
to the type (strength) of cooperation associated with the offer.
Another inviting research direction deals with generalization of the concept of
opposition, or more generally, the “motivational force” of each party (defined by ∇U(x)
when the utility U(x) exists) to problems for which no utility function can possibly be
defined.  The existence of a utility function hinges upon the requirements that
preferences be transitive, complete, continuous, and independent of the path by which a
position is reached (equifinality).  These assumptions have been rejected by many
analysts as being problematic, e.g., people too often display circular preferences, and
the satisfaction accrued by an agent depends on the history of the negotiation.  In such
cases, there provably does not exist a utility function defined solely on the offer space.
However a “motivational force,” corresponding to the gradient ∇U(x) does exist: recall
that the gradient measured the preferred direction of local movement at a point, and the
strength of the desire to move in that direction, and these notions still do apply
meaningfully to the agents at that position.  Therefore a measure of this “force” can be
defined meaningfully in terms of the local preferences at a position.  There is a close
analogy with the mathematics of the electromagnetic field encountered in physics:
motivation is like a force, and utility is like the potential corresponding to the force. The
electric field is always the gradient of a potential (E = –∇V, and the gain in V in
moving from one point to another is independent of the path) and one can do any
analysis using the force field or the potential equivalently; this corresponds to the
traditional utility assumptions.  However, the magnetic field H is in general not a gradi-
ent of a potential (curl H ≠ 0 which implies nontransitivity and path-dependence); but
formal analysis about a force is clearly meaningful even when a potential does not exist.
This case corresponds to the way we have used the notion of opposition, focusing on the
gradients more than on any utility function that a gradient may belong to. This analogy
captures the spirit of our call for systematic methods for dealing with local preference
information, without carrying the baggage of unrealistic rationality assumptions from
utility theory.
Appendix A. Determining the Region of Possibly Efficient Compromises
In Fig. 1, the analyst has conservatively estimated the extreme values p ∈ [0.3, 3] of
management’s tradeoffs (slopes of the level curves of the utility function UM(w,S)).
Note that these extreme values do not depend on the point e3 or any other specific point,
but are estimated as bounds on UM’s slope for the entire region of interest.  Using this
information, and the fact that efficient points in the interior of X must be tangential
points (Theorem 1, part A)  the set E of possibly efficient compromises can be
determined as follows. Computing the union’s gradient from equation (1), we have
∇UU (w,s) = − 1.951
w − 5.596( )2 ew + 0.5 es
Consider first the extreme value of management’s gradient p = 0.3. Since
  
v 
∇ UU (w,S) =  − k
v 
∇ UM(w,S) for efficient points, we can find one extreme contract
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curve (which is thus a boundary of E) by solving
−
1.951
w − 5.596( )2 ew + 0.5 es = − k 0.3ew  + es( )
which has as its solution w = 1.98.  Likewise, solving the same equation with p = 3
results in w = 4.45 as the other extreme contract curve. The region between w = 1.98
and w = 4.45 is thus the desired set E.
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